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The Way We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts
and Domestic Arrangements*
Carol Weisbrod*
'Law means so pitifully little to life. Life is so terrifyingly dependent
on the law."
Karl N. Llewellyn
What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective
I. INTRODUCTION
There is currently great interest in the subject of contracts and
the family, particularly, although not exclusively, among those who
apply principles of law and economics to marriage contracts.'
* © 1994 by Carol Weisbrod.
** Ellen Ash Peters Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
An early version of this paper was given at the Grand Tetons meeting of the North
American section of the International Society on Family Law, June 11, 1993 under the
title "Default Principles in Family Contracting." The paper also was delivered at the
Symposium, Twenty-Five Years of Divorce Revolution, sponsored by the University of
Utah College of Law, held October 15-16, 1993, and at a Harvard Law School facul-
ty workshop on December 17, 1993. I learned from the discussions at each of these
sessions. Some of this paper expands on material in a forthcoming casebook, Family
Law, co-authored by Lee Teitelbaum, Leslie Harris, and myself. I am, in general,
indebted to that work. The material on Llewellyn draws in part on an unpublished
paper called "Article Two as a Framework for Groups," a comment on the presenta-
tion by Zipporah Wiseman at the 1986 meeting of the Law and Society Association.
The discussion of Nathan Isaacs uses material from a paper given at the Conference
on Jews and Law in the United States, Madison, Wisconsin, November 1990. At vari-
ous points in connection with this work I have received generous support from the
University of Connecticut School of Law. I would also like to acknowledge help re-
ceived from the following individuals: Allen Kamp, Richard Kay, Leon Lipson, Martha
Minow, Carl Schneider, Pamela Sheingorn, Aviam Soifer, and Lee Teitelbaum.
1. For an overview of many of the complex themes involved in the question of
contracts and the family, see CARL E. SCHNEIDER, FAMILY LAW ch.5 (forthcoming).
For a discussion of the application of contract principles to family law, see Carl E.
Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1828-33 (1985).
One normative orientation was suggested by Professor Macaulay in 1977. See
Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures and the Complexities of Con.
tract, 11 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 507, 508-10 (1977). Noting that his students viewed the
specificity of contractual rights and duties in a marriage contract as inconsistent with
long term commitments to marriage, Macaulay said: "Of course, my students may be
wrong, at least insofar as persons do not wish to play the traditional roles of hus-
band and wife." Id. at 508 n.1. In general, Macaulay said that there are costs to
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Works discussing marriage and contracts sometimes treat contracts
issues generally as they relate to the creation of lives-in-common
and sometimes target specific contractual solutions to problems of
family law, such as support after divorce2 or surrogacy contracts.
There is also great skepticism about contracts and family law,
particularly as the contracts involve long-term, on-going, typically
marital, relationships.3 The skeptical view resists the "commercial"
version of marriage such as that described by George Bernard Shaw
in 1903: "[N]othing is more certain," Shaw wrote, "than that in both
[England and America] the progressive modification of the marriage
contract will be continued until it is no more onerous nor irrevoca-
ble than any ordinary commercial deed of partnership."4 Under one
standard Anglo-American view, marriage must be more than an
ordinary commercial arrangement, and is weakened by comparison
with such arrangements.
A broad version of the skeptical position rests in part on a view
which associates contract law with individualism in the sense of
selfishness, and with the well-known idea that one party has the
right to break a contract so long as that breaching party pays dam-
ages.5 This approach-perform or pay damages, it does not matter
using contract norms and third party interventions to deal with disputes. Id. at 509.
The entire matter then becomes a cost-benefit problem in particular contexts. Id. at
509-10.
2. There is much writing on this subject. See, e.g., June Carbone & Margaret
F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change and Divorce Re-
form, 65 TuL. L. REV. 953, 977-79 (1991); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decision-Mak-
ing About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 70-94 (1990); Jeffrey E. Stake,
Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397, 415-53 (1992). For earlier
relevant writings, see Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 passim (1979); Marjorie
M. Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL.
L. REV. 204, 291-334 (1982); Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage:
Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1249-78 (1974). The current discus-
sions, often derived from law-and-economics perspectives, focus heavily on a discus-
sion of incentives in individual bargaining. By contrast, this Article, in its treatment
of Llewellyn and Isaacs, focuses on issues of the relationship of law to the changing
social institutions.
3. For one critique, see Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 13-33 (1989). Some writing on mandatory planning for divorce stresses that
the idea of a pre-marital contract governing the economics of divorce would have no
application to behavior during the marriage. See, e.g., Banks McDowell, Contracts in
the Family, 45 B.U. L. REV. 43, 47-54 (1965).
4. GEORGE B. SHAW, MAN AND SUPERMAN: A COMEDY AND A PHILOSOPHY, in 2
THE BODLEY HEAD: BERNARD SHAW 489, 746-47 (Max Reinhardt ed., Bodley Head
1971) (1903) ("The Revolutionist's Handbook").
5. This view is perhaps derived from the well-known comment of Oliver
Wendell Holmes: "The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing else." Oliver W.
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which-is not, it is thought, an appropriate one to use in the domes-
tic and particularly marital context, in which there is so much reli-
ance on the idea of a permanent association.' In the end, the propo-
sition of the skeptics is that there are radical and finally insur-
mountable tensions between the ideas represented by contract and
family, both in the state of mind necessary to enter the structures,
and in the sorts of values which the two are said to encourage.
The tensions between the ideas of contract and the ideas in-
voked by the words "marriage" and "family" can be stated in differ-
ent vocabularies. Toennies' distinction between gemeinschaft and
gesellschaft7 and Hegel's comment that rights in the family do not
exist until the family dissolves' both suggest the current idiom. The
contrast is often between a liberal individualistic rights emphasis
and a communitarian emphasis, or between "contract" representing
individual wills and "status" representing a collective judgment and
a limit on individual choice. We know that the state of mind which
the law of contracts generally requires focuses on arms-length bar-
gaining, and an economic exchange relationship. How could we even
imagine that this would work within family relationships?
Indeed, there is a long history of opposition to the idea of mar-
riage as a contract, even when its contractual aspects are noted.
The late nineteenth-century Supreme Court, in Maynard v. Hill,9
stressed how different marriage is from ordinary contracts. The
Court noted, in regularly quoted language, that "whilst marriage is
often termed [a civil contract]-to indicate that it must be founded
upon the agreement of the parties, and does not require any reli-
gious ceremony for its solemnization-it is something more than a
mere contract."" There were many ways in which the marriage
contract was different from other contracts. To begin with, "[tihe
consent of the parties is of course essential to its existence, but
when the contract to marry is executed by the marriage, a relation
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
6. This reliance interest is not limited to domestic arrangements. See, for ex-
ample, the discussion of plant closings in Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 701-06 (1988).
7. See FERDINAND TOENNIES ON SOCIOLOGY: PURE, APPLIED, AND EMPIRICAL 65,
160-69 (Werner J. Cabnman & Rudolf Heberle eds., 1971).
8. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Thomas M. Knox trans., 1949).
"The right which the individual enjoys on the strength of the family unity and which
is in the first place simply the individual's life within this unity, takes on the form
of right (as the abstract moment of determinate individuality) only when the family
begins to dissolve." Id. at 58.
9. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
10. Id. at 210-11.
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between the parties is created which they cannot change."1 By
contrast, "[o]ther contracts may be modified, restricted, or enlarged,
or entirely released upon the consent of the parties."12 In the end,
the focus was on the larger social meaning of marriage. Marriage,
the Court said, "is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its
purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the
family and of society, without which there would be neither civiliza-
tion nor progress.""
The largest issue here would seem to be the relation between
the family and the state, and the role of the state in marriage and
other domestic arrangements. Traditionally, the issue of law and
the collective decision represented by law, is conceded to be very
large in the context of the regulation of marriage-despite the para-
doxical point that the family is often said to be "autonomous" and in
the "private" sphere." The state, it has been said, is the third par-
ty to the marriage contract. Yet of course, from one point of view,
the state is a kind of third party to all contracts. The role of the
state is, finally, what distinguishes contracts from unenforceable
understandings or agreements. Thus the different role of the state
in relation to marriage and ordinary contracts is a difference in
degree and not in kind. It remains true, however, that one way of
talking about this difference in degree is to insist that it is, finally,
a difference in kind. And one can also say that while marriage itself
is a contract, the contract is executed with the marriage, and after
that marriage is a status in which the judgment of the community,
through law, then controls the situation. 4
11. Id. at 211.
12. Id.
13. Id. The marriage contract was subject to variation even at the time the Su-
preme Court wrote its description.
It is also clear, as one looks at proposals for reform of marriage, that the
facts underlying the word marriage can be enormously different from country to
country and time to time. Thus, Leon Blum's Marriage suggests equal sexual experi-
ence as a remedy in a world in which, whatever the theory, the facts usually in-
volved an experienced husband and an inexperienced wife. See LEON BLUM, MAR-
RIAGE 102-64 (Warre B. Wells trans., 1937) (1907). Compare this to the American
ideology of the romantic marriage of virgins for life, controlling in theory and per-
haps in fact, until fairly recently.
13. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV.
1135, 1144-58.
14. See 1 JOEL P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DI-
VORCE § 2, at 2 (Boston, Little, Brown 1881). Bishop concluded that the contract
ended upon marriage: "Actual marriage, in any form which makes the parties in law
husband and wife, is performance. Nothing short is." Id. At marriage, therefore, the
contract ceased, and thereafter it was appropriate to think of marriage as a status.
But the ideas of status and contract also involve issues of degree and not kind.
780 [1994: 777
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An argument based on the special character of marriage might
also stress that marital promises are too vague to be truly contrac-
tual. 5 Alternatively, it might be argued that in longstanding rela-
tionships" in which there are constant adjustments and readjust-
ments to be made, there is no point in talking about enforceable
contracts. Indeed, as a general matter, one might do better thinking
in terms of obligations."
As to these observations, certain specific answers may be pro-
posed. First, the traditional marriage contract may be more precise
than is sometimes suggested. In 1939, Max Radin gave a clear out-
line of this view of the*contractual aspects of marriage. 8 He noted
the unusual character of marriage as a contract. He stated that
[t]he contract of marriage, even as a consensual contract, is not
treated in law as other contracts are treated." 9 But then Radin
gave depth to the promises of mutual love and support. The recipro-
cal duties owed, he said, are these: "(1) cohabitation, (2) sexual ac-
cess, (3) sexual fidelity, (4) conjugal kindness. In addition, (5) the
husband owes the wife maintenance and support and (6) the wife
owes the husband the duty of household management.""
As to long-range readjustment issues, we may note Ian
Macneil's work on relational contracts suggests that the emphasis
in contract law on one-shot transactions mischaracterizes the many
commercial transactions that are long term.2 This approach al-
most necessarily suggests an interest in problems of ongoing action
and readjustment and thus, one might look for affinities between
contract issues in family law and commercial law.
15. See Ellman, supra note 3, at 18, 28-32.
16. Note the difference between readjustments in a context assumed to be sta-
ble, on which there is considerable reliance, and readjustments which include the
destruction of the context.
17. See Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families: Membership, Lou-
ing and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REv. 275, 310-25 (1992-93); see also MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLrICAL DISCOURSE 109-44
(1991); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Intergenerational Responsibility and Family Obligation: On
Sharing, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 765.
18. Max Radin, The Common Law of the Family, in 6 LEGAL RELATIONS 79, 169
(Roscoe Pound et al. eds., 1939).
19. Id. at 161.
20. Id. at 169. These "are created by the status of being husband and wife. The
contract of marriage does not establish them. That merely creates the status." Id.
The first four of these, Radin continues, "are so inseparably connected with the sta-
tus of husband and wife that they cannot be altered by any agreement between the
parties nor waived by non- insistence or disuse." Id. The last two can however be
"regulated to a limited extent by agreement." Id.
21. See Ian Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985
WIS. L. REv. 483.
No. 2]
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On the issue of "rights" versus "obligations," one might remem-
ber that promises, including contractual promises, are a way of
creating obligations." If a discussion insists on looking at contract
in terms of rights rather than obligations, this seems to reflect a
cultural overlay more than the contractual idea itself. One might
also note that there are contracts (such as church covenants) which
do not have economic transactions as their prime focus.23 There
may be no legal difference between a contractual promise, a legal
agreement, a covenant and a vow. The history of contracts is a his-
tory of different contracts in different contexts, and marriage is one
of these. Thus it misconceives the issue to ask now whether mar-
riage is appropriately part of a unified theory of contracts under-
stood (at the moment) to be focused on economic relationships of
one particular kind.
On the issue of hedonistic individualism, one might recall the
quite different values associated with the individualism of Thoreau,
who went to the woods because he wished to "live deliberately," 4
or the hasidic Rabbi who said that he would not be asked, in the
coming world, why he had not been Moses but rather why he had
not been himself.' This, one might say, is the high ground of indi-
vidualism, the "here I stand, I can do no other" sort of individual-
ism ' which ordinarily commands a certain (but not limited) re-
spect.
This Essay does not so much offer detailed responses to de-
tailed questions, as suggest that an emphasis on the status or col-
lective judgment aspect of marriage to the point of the rejection of
contractual themes (or possible contractual solutions to certain
problems) cuts us off from some interesting ideas in the traditional
contract literature. These ideas are particularly important in a time
22. See Elizabeth Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 687.
23. See CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA 59-79 (1980). In all con-
texts, there is the issue in contract law of oppression or unfair bargaining. See Peter
Gabel & Jay M. Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 172, 172-84 (David Kairys ed., 1982). Also note the "choices"
offered the slave, Betty, in the discussion by Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and
Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916, 1921-28, 1931 (1987).
24. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1862).
25. MARTIN BUBER, TALES OF THE HASIDIM: EARLY MASTERS 251 (1947).
26. Note also a distinction between "personalism" and "individualism."
Personalism and individualism must not be confused. Personalism gives
priority to the person and not the individual self. To give priority to the
person means respecting the unique and inalienable value of the other per-
son, as well as one's own, for a respect that is centered only on one's indi-
vidual self to the exclusion of others proves itself to be fraudulent.
THoMAs MERTON, THE WAY OF CHUANG Tzu 17 (1965).
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of significant social uncertainty, much of it arising out of the impact
of the current changes in the situation of women. The skeptical
position on the use of contracts tends to a conclusion that an official
state attitude towards such contracts must begin with a pre-
sumptive negative, based on the view that the law and theory of
contract is most likely to be irrelevant. Analysis of these issues from
within the field of contracts suggests that the state stance can often
be more open to individual variation without sacrifice of collective
judgment.
This discussion returns to some ideas about contract common
in the first half of the twentieth century. Scholarship of that era
sometimes viewed contracts in relation to general questions of law
and society, and did not restrict its inquiry to the incentive-based
bargaining of individuals. Contracts material was founded on issues
of law and social change, although the change was often in commer-
cial practice rather than, for example, social relations.
This Essay adopts a stance in which everything is discussable
in contract terms. This is done not because everything is contracts,
but because this particular exercise is useful in bringing to the
surface a variety of interactions between individual and official
behavior. The paper addresses in this manner some arguments
rejecting connections between contracts and family law and sup-
ports some material suggesting that there are in fact certain con-
nections between these fields.
Part II of this Essay considers the idea of domestic contracts
within the contract theory of another generation, discussing Karl
Llewellyn's views of contracts and group life, including his com-
ments on marriage and divorce. As background to the Llewellyn
discussion, there is an exposition, following some suggestions in the
work of Nathan Isaacs, of the relationship of standardized or de-
fault contracts27 to status/contract questions in a time of social
change.
Addressing the argument that there is some fundamental in-
compatibility between the exchange ideas underlying contracts and
the substance of domestic arrangements, Part III offers fictional
examples of negotiation in domestic relationships.' These fictional
27. At times the law (for example, the Uniform Commercial Code) provides a
presumptive contract, or a default contract, for parties in particular conventional
relationships. The parties may vary the terms of the contract-"unless otherwise
agreed" is one typical formula suggesting the possibility-but contract terms will be
supplied if the parties fail to do so. In certain situations, the parties are assumed to
have intended a contract of some sort.
28. Domestic arrangement is used here rather than "marriage" because some of
the examples relate to non-marital negotiations. In general, the issues raised in the
No. 2] 783
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contracts often relate not merely to issues of economic arrange-
ments on dissolution of the relationship, but also to the substance of
the arrangement itself. Within the context of particular ideas about
the role of women, specific contracting for domestic arrangements
was apparently not foreign to, for example, the nineteenth-century
English mentality, and may not be as foreign to our own as is some-
times suggested.
Part IV discusses domestic agreements as legally enforceable
contracts, using the general framework of Article Two of the Uni-
form Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") as a point of departure. Article
Two was developed to solve a problem in the field of sales which has
an analogue in the present discussion of domestic arrangements.
The problem was that the law recognized one model while the social
fact revealed many models. This is our situation as to domestic
arrangements. It seems clear that one answer will not do for every-
one. Some, for example, still want "traditional marriages," while
others insist that only economic independence can give anyone a
basis for equality in any domestic relationship.29 As to each group,
there will be some who want to apply their understandings univer-
sally, and some who, while believing that their mode is in some
sense more valid, will be concerned about the methods available
which will allow others to live out their versions of the good life.
The relationship of this discussion to general issues of plural-
ism and tolerance is obvious. While many methods are available in
different contexts to achieve a pluralist goal,"0 in the context of
domestic arrangements, it seems clear that explicit contracts are a
possible way of both achieving individualized solutions and, ulti-
mately, of perhaps changing the substance of the default contract or
contractual options. The limits on the idea of contract-limits found
in the law of contracts itself, in policing doctrines, and in non-vari-
able default provisions-are ways of accommodating the various
state interests involved.
II. MARRIAGE AS AN INSTITUTION: SOME OLDER THEORY ON
PRIVATE ORDERING MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
"The nub of the situation is the persistence of old patterns side by
side with new.... This side-by-sideness is found inside single mar-
riages, and as between different couples. Here, as in business and
current discussion relate both to marital and non-marital contracting, and in fact, we
see much less difference in the relationships than we used to, though-as will be
suggested in part II-the default contracts of the two may still be different.
29. The point applies with particular force to women in relationships with men.
30. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 2, at 248.
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industry, the old is far from dying because, or as soon as, the new
has come. While law still purports to seek a single way for all."31
In The Death of Contract, Grant Gilmore indicated that if asked
to "locate the law of contract on the legal spectrum," most people
would place it in the field of commercial law." It is true, he wrote,
"that our unitary contract theory has always had an uncomfortable
way of spilling over into distinctly non-commercial situations. 3
Thus, he wrote, "what may be good for General Motors does not al-
ways make sense when applied to charitable subscriptions, antenup-
tial agreements and promises to convey the family farm provided
the children will support the old people for life."' Still, he conclud-
ed, "we feel instinctively that commercial law is the heart of the
matter and that, the need arising, the commercial rules can be
applied over, with whatever degree of disingenuity may be required,
to fit, for example, the case of King Lear and his unruly daugh-
ters."35
Not surprisingly, the present contractual discussion in the field
of family law focuses on the problem of marriage and, more particu-
larly, marital dissolution in an era of no-fault divorce. The contracts
discussion has been approached with various objectives. Sometimes
the idea has been to provide a new wife with contractual incentives
(promises to support on divorce) to live within a traditional mod-
el. 36 Sometimes the idea has been that alternative models could be
developed through contract. As to both, it would seem that the older
31. Karl N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281,
1295 n.36 (1932) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Divorce 1].
32. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 8 (1974). The commercial law
and family law approaches may not be as removed from one another as we think.
There is, for example, a similarity between the fraud ground for annulment in early
English law (fraud as to the person involved, later fraud in the essentials of the
marriage) and the idea of a real defense based on fraud (fraud in the factum, not
knowing the nature of the document signed) available even against a holder in due
course in the field of negotiable instruments. The conclusion here is not somehow
that marriage "is" a negotiable instrument. Rather marriage and negotiable instru-
ments both involve contracts viewed as more binding than ordinary contracts. Every-
day fraud is not enough to avoid the contract. So too Hochster v. De La Tour, 118
Eng. Rep. 922 (1853), discusses the idea of anticipatory repudiation in the context of
marriage contracts, leases, and the sale of goods. See also Taylor v. Caldwell, 122
Eng. Rep. 309 (KB. 1863).
33. GILMORE, supra note 33, at 8.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. While questions can be raised concerning the wisdom of such contracts in
times of economic uncertainty, and their relation to particular feminist objectives, I
assume that such contracts could be made within a broad scheme of pluralist con-
tracting.
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work in commercial law may have some relevance.
As already noted, the current discussion of contracts and the
family, like much of the writing on contracts generally, uses the in-
sights of an economic discussion and focuses on incentives and indi-
vidual bargaining behavior. An earlier literature dealt with differ-
ent questions. Some of it, understood broadly, considered the prob-
lem of the law of contracts and "life," "society," or "social change."
As to such issues, one view of contracts and social life might stress
issues of inequality of bargaining power. Legal realists presented
another, more positive view, stressing the potential of the law of
contracts for autonomy and the structuring of institutions. 7
While law and social change is a subject of continuing interest,
it is frequently addressed today, and for some time, in terms of
public law and legislation, clearly a major mechanism through
which law addresses the world. It is also, of course, implicated in
the discussion-the preoccupation of American legal theory for de-
cades-_of judicial decision-making, and was addressed in the 1920s
and 1930s by Llewellyn, in his work on contracts and sales. Karl
Llewellyn worked in the fields of contracts and commercial law. He
was interested in the "role of contract in the social order, the part
that contract plays in the life of men."38 He produced writing which
related these areas to more general issues of group theory, and, at
least once, directly wrote on issues of the family in the context of
divorce.3" Related questions were addressed somewhat earlier by
Nathan Isaacs," again often using contracts as the basic material.
When Llewellyn used an idea like the "standardized contract" of
marriage, he invoked a contracts literature on the subject which can
be represented by Isaacs,4 who worked both on issues of standard-
37. On realism and the realists, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 193-212 (1992); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
YALE, 1927-1960, at 190-91 (1986); AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William Fischer et al.
eds., 1993).
38. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE
L.J. 704, 705 (1931).
39. See Llewellyn, Divorce I, supra note 31; Karl N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law
of Divorce: II, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1933) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Divorce Ill.
40. Nathan Isaacs (1886-1941) made his career as a legal academic, albeit one
who spent most of his life on the faculty of Harvard Business School rather than on
the faculty of a law school.
Isaac's first professional work, entitled The Merchant and His Law, was first
published in the Journal of Political Economy in 1915. It was a subject he worked
on until his death. His early work also was heavily focused on legal history.
41. Isaac's work on commercial law was cited with approval, and even enthusi-
asm, by Karl Llewellyn in the 1930s, and his 1917 piece on adhesion contracts is
still the first citation on the subject in the Kessler, Gilmore casebook of the 1970s.
See FRIEDRICH KESSLER & GRANT GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 11
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ization and on status to contract ideas, well known in their formula-
tion by Sir Henry Maine. The stance adopted here as to both
Llewellyn and Isaacs stresses connections between their perceptions
of family law and contract law. Of course, neither devoted primary
intellectual attention to issues of family law.
In The Standardizing of Contracts, Isaacs proposed that "sta-
tus-to-contract" was about differences in degree rather than kind
and that these differences were reflected in cycles of change.42 An
adhesion contract which was now a status relation might once have
been an individualized contract relation.43 He saw an advantage to
adhesion contracts as they related to issues of oppression in bar-
gaining, suggesting that there was much to be gained by standard-
ization in freeing people from the "accident of power in individual
bargaining.""
Isaacs entered the conversation on adhesion contracts through
a discussion of the soundness and universality of Sir Henry Maine's
familiar sentence to the effect that "the movement of progressive
societies [was] a movement from status to contract."45 Roscoe
Pound had responded in part by noting that whatever may have
been true of Roman law, this was not an accurate statement as to
Anglo-American law. Isaacs suggested that perhaps we might think
about the whole thing somewhat differently. "After all," he wrote,
"the question is not so much one of status and contract as it is of a
broader classification that embraces these concepts: standardized
relations and individualized relations."4" Maine, he said, labeled as
Status those relations, including "ancient family relations, or caste,"
(2d ed. 1970) (citing Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34
(1917)); see also HORWITZ, supra note 37 (containing references to Isaac's works);
Howard 0. Hunter Essay on Contract and Status, Race, Marriage, and the Meretri-
cious Spouse, 64 VA. L. REV. 1039 (1978) (containing discussions of Isaac's works);
Manfred Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REV. 941
(1971) (same).
42. Isaacs, supra note 41, at 39-40.
43. Id. at 40.
44. Id. at 47. Isaacs's papers are at the Baker Library, Harvard Business
School. I thank the library for its courtesy in permitting use of these materials.
Isaac's doctrinal writing through the 1920s and 1930s considered various as-
pects of business and commercial law. Throughout his work there is a descriptive or
analytic rather than prescriptive quality.
One of the marks of Isaacs' writing is his historical point of view. Another is
his insistence on seeing problems from the point of view of the businessman or the
layman. LINCOLN F. SCHAUB & NATHAN ISAACS, THE LAW OF BusINEss PROBLEMS
(1925).
45. ISAACS, supra note 41, at 34 (citing HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861)).
46. Id. at 39.
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which were "thoroughly standardized."47 In such relations, the "pe-
culiarities of the individual agreement of individual members of
society were irrelevant."' But this was true, he continued, "of
[many] peculiarities of... agreement.., in later stages of society,
where a formal contract of this or that type results in a more or less
standardized relation."49 Among these relations, of standardized
contract, he included not only early Roman forms of sale and Eng-
lish conveyances of land, but also marriage. ° For Isaacs, it is
worth noting, "[iun origin, these relations are ... contractual."51 It
is in their workings that they "recall the rdgime of status."52 Sta-
tus-to-contract is a difference of degree, not of kind,5" and Isaacs
saw in his own time a distinct "veering back to status"5 via stan-
dardized contracts.
Taking the view of a legal historian writing very broadly about
cycles of legal history over millennia, Isaacs noted that it might be
that "if we were able to go back to what we accept as standard fami-
ly relations, we should find their basis, too, in the hardening of
individual practices into rules."55 It might even be that behind the
idea of caste, "there was a progress from the individual non-stan-
dardized conduct to the standardized."55 The point was that one
should get away from an idea of legal history progress as movement
on this point in one direction or another, and see "a kind of pendu-
lum movement back and forth between periods of standardization
and periods of individualization."57 Codification, Isaacs suggested,
was associated with the freezing of patterns and equity with the
individualized contract.58
Isaacs commented on adhesion contracts again in 1939 in a way
which included the idea of standard default contracts and the prob-
lem of non-standardized categories of transactions. He first con-
sidered transactions at the bank, post office, department store, doc-
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 39-40.
54. Id. at 40.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 45-46.
59. Nathan Isaacs, Contracts, Torts and Trusts, in 6 LEGAL RELATIONS 1, 34
(Roscoe Pound et al. eds., 1939).
[1994: 777
CONTRACTS AND MARRIAGE
tor, and insurance company." The standardized categories and
relations "are not necessarily simple, but they are standardized to
such a degree that, when nothing is said, the law is able to supply
the necessary details."6 There would, however, be a problem when
the social situation was changing. "It is only when one uses the
method of silence in such odd and outlandish relations as hiring a
personal publicity man, campaign manager, travel companion, or
ghost writer, that the whole scheme breaks down because the law
has no guide for filling in the blanks." 2
Two points are important here. First, the idea of the law filling
in contract terms from a presumed intent based on a standard
transaction is very different from an idea in which law tells people
what to do based on an imposed norm. Second, in a time of radical
social change, the method of silence in which an underlying default
contract is assumed by both parties will often be inadequate. If
there was a judicially approved default pattern, a problem would
arise where a recognized form no longer fit diverse facts."
For present purposes, the significance of Isaacs' historical per-
spective is not his version of the great cycles of legal history, but
the suggestion that the social rule has its ultimate origin in the
practice of individuals. The individualized contract might historical-
ly-and, by extrapolation, for the future-be itself the source of the
legal norm.
Related ideas in contracts and variation of rules of con-
tract-whether or not Isaacs is the precise source ' -were dis-
cussed by Karl Llewellyn, in his work on contracts and, with partic-
ular application to the family, in the articles on divorce."
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. Surrogacy contracts provide an example of the odd-if not outland-
ish-relation for which there is no single clear legal analog, although several are
possible.
63. See Nathan Isaacs, The Sale in Legal Theory and in Practice, 26 VA. L.
REV. 651, 651 (1940).
64. See Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Mer-
chant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 477 n.43 (1987). Wiseman suggests that
Llewellyn's two 1939 articles on sales and society (Across Sales on Horseback and
The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales) were titled to acknowledge Isaacs' criticism of
the Sales Act of 1906, in which a commercial transaction was typified by a horseman
purchasing a saddle. Id.
65. See Llewellyn, Divorce I, supra note 31, at 1281-84; Llewellyn, Divorce II,
supra note 39, at 249-51.
The unpublished third part of the divorce study is a 17-page typed manu-
script in the Llewellyn papers at the University of Chicago. Karl Llewellyn, Behind
the Law of Divorce: III (Dated 1932-34, and typed in 1965). I am grateful to the
University of Chicago law library for making this material available to me.
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Llewellyn's work on divorce, as he indicated in the first of his arti-
cles, was not well received by his colleagues, one of whom suggested
that its defects of style were exceeded only by its defects of sub-
stance." Still, the work is of continuing interest.
Llewellyn sees not only the "main story" of the history of mar-
riage17 but also the variant patterns and finally the individual sto-
ries and the individually negotiated arrangements within the gener-
al patterns. "[Tloo much is thought and written," he said, "as if we
had a pattern of ways that made up marriage."8 Recently di-
vorced, and distressed to some degree about the speed with which it
was possible to be divorced, Llewellyn nonetheless emphasized the
critical point that, in the divorce crisis of the 1930s, only one form
of marriage was actually in decay, the pre-industrial limited expec-
tation form, and that "[niew institutions of marriage, adjusted to
new times, are in the building."69 The motives and concerns of
those entering were, of course, not the same. For example, as
Llewellyn pointed out, "[t]hose who marry at twenty search in the
main with other and less economic eyes than suitors ten or twenty
years their seniors."70
Llewellyn indicated that this work on divorce related to his
other work on law and society and on contracts.71 He was through-
out the essay concerned with the relations between law and society:
"Society moulds and makes the individual; but individuals are and
mould society. Law is a going whole we are born into; but law is a
changing something we help remodel. Law decides cases, but cases
Llewellyn began the third part of the study by reviewing what he had al-
ready said: Pair marriage would continue; the desire for relatively permanent rela-
tionships was at the base of it, interlocked with matters of sex, child rearing, and
economics; expectations of the institution were rising and experiments being made;
and divorce was simply the next step in this process. He spoke also of the "neglect-
in-action," of the official theories which called for state participation in divorce pro-
ceedings, and for strict attention to defenses in order to demonstrate a practice of
consent divorce. Id. at 2.
66. Llewellyn, Divorce I, supra note 31, at 1281 n.*; see also WILLIAM TWINING,
KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 194 (1973) ("[Ijnstead of confining
himself to testing rigorously and in detail some precisely formulated hypotheses,
Llewellyn ended up with a general disquisition on marriage and divorce, a pot-pourri
of general theory, statistical data and personal impressions.").
67. For a summary, in english, of Llewellyn's treatment of marriage in his ger-
man work, see Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 705,
767-70 (1992) (discussing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, RECHT, RECHTSLEBEN UND
GESELLSCHAFT (Manfred Rehbinder ed., 1977) (1933)).
68. Llewellyn, Divorce I, supra note 31, at 1285.
69. Llewellyn, Divorce II, supra note 39, at 260.
70. Llewellyn, Divorce I, supra note 31, at 1291.
71. Id. at 1281 n.*.
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make law. Law deflects society, but society is reflected in the
law. 72
Llewellyn was, as Gilmore noted, a particularizer rather than
an abstractor." These details, however, were not simply laid out,
but were reconfigured, juxtaposed with constant footnote asides,
unsystematically, and to many people irritatingly without order or
clarity.74 But Llewellyn's descriptions of the human situation gen-
erally, whether in the context of family law or contracts or commer-
cial law, have a striking richness and immediacy.75 He saw, for
example, that the issue of marital stability, in which he was inter-
ested, had more fundamentally to do with marriage than with di-
vorce itself. "[D]iscussion of divorce has too often started from the
premise that divorce was an evil in itself, as if it was divorce that
mattered. Whereas what matters is wedlock."76 He saw the ex-
treme diversity of institutions which even the United States of his
time revealed. "Our society shows not a marriage institution, but a
goodly number of such, overlapping, contradictory, both in needs
and in effects."77 He saw the impact of parents on children,78 as
well as a more general social pressure on young couples. "Not all
folk are born parents" he wrote, "indeed I suspect that considerably
less than half of the existing stock would accept that job, and that
even of women not so hugely many would 'want children' if social
patterns had not taught them that children were a thing to
want."79 He saw that marriage norms might vary by region, class,
and culture, and stressed that he was dealing with bourgeois mar-
riage.80
While is it sometimes suggested that his interest in the family,
and particularly his articles on divorce, have their origin in his
particular biography-and especially his divorce from his first
wife-it is equally important to see that Llewellyn's intellectual
72. Id. at 1283.
73. Grant Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1962).
74. See Ansaldi, supra note 67, at 717 n.44, (describing Llewellyn's What Price
Contract? as "fantasmagorical" and "wildly undisciplined").
75. Certainly Llewellyn continues to be interesting to scholars. Recent work on
Llewellyn includes: Ansaldi, supra note 67; N.E.H. Hull,. Reconstructing the Origins of
Realistic Jurisprudence: A Prequel to the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange Over Legal Real-
ism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1302; James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk:
A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE
L.J. 156 (1987).
76. Llewellyn, Divorce II, supra note 39, at 262.
77. Llewellyn, Divorce I, supra note 31, at 1287.
78. Id. at 1290.
79. Id. at 1292 n.26.
80. Id. at 1281.
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map included families as among the significant groups in society.
The transactions he saw included family transactions. Among these
transactions was use of an engagement ring as one of the unambig-
uous tokens of a "definitive intent to change the existing situa-
tion-and to be relied on, the overt sign of utter intent to assume
obligation."8'
In the context of divorce, Llewellyn had specific institutional
concerns and was, by present standards, moderate or even conserva-
tive in his proposals, as was also true of his work on Article Two of
the U.C.C."2 (In the commercial context, what concerned Llewellyn
was the way in which the law sometimes dealt with commercial life,
and "commercial men.") The problem was not merely the abstrac-
tions A and B of the Restatements."3 The bloodlessness of those
hypotheticals, and the abstract reading of laws with which they are
associated, are still criticized by some concerned with individual
personality.' He seemed concerned with protecting individuals'
and creating a system which would permit the growth of various
forms of the marital institution. For if the underlying idea was
"[niew institutions adjusted to new times,"6 it was not likely that
the process would somehow end.
In general, Llewellyn wrote on marriage and the family against
the background of his understanding that social life was based on
groups, not individuals. 7 The marriage contract built an institu-
81. Llewellyn, supra note 38, at 711-12; see Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and
Promises, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 203, 204 (1990) (suggesting a possible relation be-
tween use of engagement ring and abandonment of actions for breach of promise to
marry).
82. This is particularly evident in the neglect of issues relating to consumers.
83. Karl N. Llewellyn, Our Case Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance II, 48
YALE L.J. 779, 781, 785 (1938). The critique of offer-and-acceptance rules in those
articles also found their way into the Article Two provisions on formation of con-
tracts.
84. See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO,
HOL iES, JEFFERSON AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 3-4, 43-50 (1976).
85. Se(, for example, references to aging women in Llewellyn, Divorce 11, supra
note 39, at 280.
86. Id. at 260.
87. Llewellyn was, by this time, generally interested in questions of groups. In
1925, he published an article which contained material on group control. Karl N.
Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 AM. ECON. REV. 665,
672 (1925). Llewellyn asserted that "[ilncreasingly, associations are forming which
adopt their own rules of action and even settle their own disputes." Id. This was not
limited to an observation about sales, and the buyers and sellers of goods.
Corporation, labor union, manufacturers' association, farmers'
codperative-their number, size and experience increase. And the rules
which, by permission of the state, and within limits which the state pre-
scribes, such associations lay down and apply, are part of the body of our
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tion, not a relationship. The domestic arrangement-the family and
the household-was in some ways a group like other groups.
But "group" ideas were not to be seen abstractly, and specificity
marks Llewellyn's work on divorce as well as his work in contracts.
When Llewellyn attempted to redo Williston's Sales Act," he was
sensitive to the problems of internal differentiation. The common
example of this is the distinction in the U.C.C. between merchants
and non-merchants. For present purposes, the important thing is
that Llewellyn's idea was not that there was a single mercantile
community distinct from the rest of society. Rather, the merchant
community was made up of many kinds of merchants, and transac-
tions took many different forms. Llewellyn admired the English
Judge Scrutton because he really knew the timber trade."°
Llewellyn's casebook on sales had an index of commodities."1 So
too, in his work on divorce, the point was that there were many
kinds of marriages. Here, just as in the Sales Act, the law recog-
nized only one. The interest in the social side of the law, the under-
lying human pattern, is a constant in Llewellyn's work. "I love the
law of sales," he wrote, "the material grows in fascination for me
from year to year; nowhere does one come closer to life or to the
observable impact of lawmen on laymen and of laymen on law's
ways."92 Nowhere except, perhaps, the law of divorce. "[Dlivorce,"
he wrote, "is the major area of interaction between the social insti-
tution and the legal. . .
law. They are working rules; the working rules of a technical activity; the
very type of working rules which the official legal institutions are unable to
construct.
Id. By analogy, these rules, in the context of marriage, could be seen as the ways of
family life or the ways of wedlock. Llewellyn's ideas about groups are explored in
Allen Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and
the Uniform Commercial Code in Context (unpublished manuscript on file with au-
thor).
88. Williston's Uniform Sales Act (1906) was ultimately adopted by 37 states.
89. U.C.C. § 2-104, cmt. 1. (1989) ("This Article assumes that transactions be-
tween professionals in a given field require special and clear rules which may not
apply to a casual or inexperienced seller or buyer.").
90. Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 CoLUAIL L. REV.
699, 707 (1936) (citing Ronaasen & Son v. Arcos Ltd., 43 L.1. L. Rep. 1, 5 (1932)).
91. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 1073-77
(1930).
92. Llewellyn, supra note 87, at 706.
93. Llewellyn, Divorce I, supra note 31, at 1307. For Llewellyn, the family exists
as an image in the background of other discussions of other institutions. Llewellyn
saw the family and family issues as connected to the central inquiries of law, includ-
ing contract law, and society. The family was also in his mind when he thought
about public law. Llewellyn began his discussion of the Constitution with a section
called "the private law background." Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Insti-
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In relation to contract law, family cases appeared to Llewellyn
as trouble spots in a field largely focused on the problems of busi-
ness. But the area of family contract law did exist. "[Ilt includes the
promise made and relied on, but which did not bargain for reliance,
and in the case of promises to provide it laps over into the third
party beneficiary problems."94 Still, he cautioned, precedents on
consideration, for example, could not be carried over unthinkingly
from family cases to professional dealing among commercial par-
ties.9" Llewellyn included marriage and family as two among many
of society's "going concerns." Presumably in all cases, going concerns
"are not apples to be plucked from trees." 6 Despite attacks on the
idea of viewing parties to contracts as individuals,97 in the context
of the on-going concern of marriage, perhaps inevitably, he stressed
the role of individual work and individual action.9"
In his work on divorce, Llewellyn was perhaps more explicitly
normative than we expect from the writer who insisted on at least
the temporary separation of is and ought." He saw as a particular
concern the older woman.' 0 He feared that divorce was too easy,
tution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1934). He saw that "[als an institution of major size,
then, our working Constitution embraces the interlocking ways and attitudes of dif-
ferent groups and classes in the community-different ways and attitudes of different
groups and classes, but all cogging together into a fairly well organized whole." Id.
at 18. At that point Llewellyn offered a long description of a family in which the
husband goes out to work and provides for the payment of bills. The husband leaves
a house which has been organized so that he will be able to leave for work quickly,
knowing that there are things he has to pick up on his way home. This pattern
essentially carries through, in different details, to other members of the family so
that, in their very diverse ways, they all contribute to the whole. Id. at 18-19.
In considering the interaction of individuals in the smallest unit of society,
Llewellyn saw the family unit as the basic model for the structure of society as a
whole. See id. The family was not on the "private" side in the sense that it was
apart from all the rest of the world. Rather, in Llewellyn's mind, the family was
always a part of the map of the world.
94. Llewellyn, supra note 38, at 742.
95. Llewellyn, supra note 87, at 748-49.
96. Llewellyn, Divorce II, supra note 39, at 278.
97. Llewellyn, supra note 38, at 734 (referring to "the vicious heritage" of regu-
larly viewing the parties to a deal as single individuals); see infra text accompanying
185.
98. Llewellyn, Divorce II, supra note 39, at 260. Llewellyn stressed that "t]he
work of building marriages, whatever the conditions, is individual work." Id. Also,
[to generalize existent ways into such a pattern, or even into a fixed number of
typical patterns, is to lose sight precisely of that r6le of individual action which we
are seeking to explore." Divorce I, supra note 31, at 1285.
99. See HORWIVZ, supra note 37, at 210-12; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, On
What Is Wrong With Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 662 (1935).
100. Llewellyn, Divorce I, supra note 31, at 1290, 1306; Divorce II, supra note 39,
at 280.
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already in his generation, and thought that there might be special
rules for marriages of long standing.' °' He was doubtful about spe-
cial rules for marriages with children, largely because he believed
that whatever binding force the children have would already have
operated.1 2 Throughout, he worried about the question whether
law had any useful role in maintaining some particular value or
whether the social sanctions could stand on their own.' But he
did not seem prepared to simply follow society, or facilitate existing
practice. Writing in 1931, Llewellyn addressed two kinds of law, one
mandatory and based on public policy, the other "yielding."' Both
of these are "law,""5 and both have something to do with law's
channelling of human behavior.' Default contracts, or presump-
tive contracts, also channel behavior and expectations.
The application of these ideas to the present situation in do-
mestic arrangements would look something like this. Our sense of
the relative rights and obligations of married couples, nonmarried
couples, and roommates-all arguably kinds of families-typically
differ substantially. This fact suggests that social context dictates
different kinds of default contracts to which the individuals in these
relationships may be presumed to have adhered. Recognition of this
point is concealed first by an emphasis on romantic love and second
by what are taken to be the individualistic aspects of romantic love.
These default ideas seem to exist, however, and are available to the
legal system as the basis for implied terms in a contract and are
also available in dealing with the issue of whether it is likely that
in fact a certain sort of contract was made.
Of course, one would have to define the relevant community to
see what expectations might be in fact at any time. In general, how-
ever, we seem often to have such expectations, some of which may
be uncomfortable for us to acknowledge. This is why, when a wom-
an we believe to have been a "mistress," rather than a "wife," indi-
cates that a man promised her lifetime support, we may consider
his promise mere pillow talk. It seems to be an analog of seller's
101. See the discussions of "earned and vested rights" and "sense of security" on
partners in Llewellyn, Divorce II, supra note 39, at 279-80. See also id. at 284
("There is some point in making the established concern more difficult to dissolve.").
102. Id. at 284.
103. See Llewellyn, Divorce I, supra note 31, at 1296.
104. Llewellyn, supra note 38, at 729; cf U.C.C. § 1-102(lb), (3) & cmt.2 (1989)
(discussing freedom of contract and U.C.C.).
105. Llewellyn, Divorce I, supra note 31, at 729 n.54.
106. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Prob.
lem of Juristic Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1855, 1376-83 (1940); see also Carl Schneider,
20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992).
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puffing, something which is not seriously understood as contractual
talk. Thus, when Llewellyn thought that non-marital sexual ar-
rangements were "specialized" and did not involve property or in-
heritance,0 7 he was simply reflecting a general social view. We
may not think the same way about a relationship we consider a
"trial marriage," or a 'pre-marital" or "non-marital" partnership. A
"star boarder" may not be involved in the same sort of deal as a
non-marital domestic partner.1"8 The descriptive language commu-
nicates our outside sense of the "deal" when we distinguish between
a "live-in companion"-the apartment belongs to the one whose
companion he or she is-and two people living together under a
more egalitarian arrangement, whose property implications are less
certain.
Of course, the contract can be express or implied, but this does
not free us from the underlying problem of knowing what a contract
"means" or when or how to imply a contract. The classic formulation
of the doctrine of implied contracts is that of Holmes: "You always
can imply a term in a contract.""9 The question is why you do it.
It might be, "because of some belief as to the practice of the commu-
nity or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy.""0
Whether contracts are express or implied, the policies involved
relate to the appropriate relations between men and women gener-
ally. These policies were rooted in the ideal of marriage, at a time
when people had a relatively clear sense of what marriage and non
marriage meant. Some of these traditional meanings, and the con-
tracting around them, are the subject of the next section.
III. DOMESTIC ARRANGEMENTS: FICTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS,
TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS, AND THE
IDEA OF A DEFAULT CONTRACT
"It takes years to make a friendship: but a marriage may be settled
in a week-in an hour.""'
This section invokes some fictional agreements to illustrate the
idea of the default contract and to point out that domestic ar-
107. Llewellyn, Divorce: I, supra note 31, at 1298. Llewellyn also commented on
problems of duration in this context. "Chance passions do not so often outlast a year.
Passions which do outlast that period raise claims of their own." Llewellyn, Divorce:
II, supra note 39, at 283.
108. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
109. Holmes, supra note 5, at 466.
110. Id.
111. 2 ANTHONY TROLLOPE, RALPH THE HEIR 328 (John Sutherland ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1990) (1871).
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rangements, marital and non-marital, have often been understood
as involving an explicit bargain in fact."' That bargain may be
reached by the softer term "negotiation,""' but it is a bargain
nonetheless. This section does not treat the issue of enforceability
as a "contract" but only argues that a focus on the emotional or
sentimental or sexual aspects of personal relationships does not tell
the whole story and may even mislead. The idea is that undertak-
ings to live a joint life on a permanent or semi-permanent basis are
not made without serious consideration of what that joint life might
entail in terms of what might be called the actual daily and materi-
al base of the relationship. Such undertakings involve bargains and
exchanges in fact. Sometimes, as will be argued, that bargain is
largely assumed in the idea of marriage (or not). The proposal to
marry contains all the terms. As already noted, the marriage con-
tract, as understood by the people proposing and accepting, is more
specific regarding mutual obligations than is sometimes suggest-
ed." 4
Although Anthony Trollope was perhaps not thinking about it
this way, the point that the standard default contract both exists
and is specific underlies his comment that marriage can be settled
quickly. This is because the broad outlines of "marriage" and the
contract"5 of marriage, are generally understood in terms of the
112. The U.C.C. defines agreement as the "bargain in fact" as found in language
or by implication. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1989). Whether the "agreement" is a "contract"
is separately determined. Id.
In the commercial law discussion, it is plain that "law" and "practice" relate
to each other. Thus Llewellyn emphasized the issues of custom, leeways, tolerances,
and the like, all tending to the point that the contract itself was only the beginning
of the inquiry of what a contract meant. Many factors went into what a contract
meant. Some implied terms, for example, would be assumed from the situation and
in other cases custom or trade usage. Flexibility and readjustments were assumed as
desirable and normal, and dispute settlement outside the courts was also considered
normal.
These are not necessarily the views of present writers on family and contract,
who may assume, for example, a rigidity in the contractual arrangement and a nec-
essary emphasis on litigation as a remedy which Llewellyn would not have assumed.
See generally Llewellyn, supra note 38.
113. See, e.g., EDWARD GIBBON, MEMOIRS OF MY LIFE (Betty Radice ed., 1990)
(1796)
A matrimonial alliance, has ever been the object of my terror rather than of
my wishes. I was not very strongly pressed by my family or my passions to
propagate the name and race of the Gibbons, and if some reasonable temp-
tations occurred in the neighborhood, the vague idea never proceeded to the
length of a serious negotiation.
Id. at 146.
114. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
115. Jesse Bernard suggests that a marriage contract is actually two contracts:
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obligations assumed in an ongoing relationship. Sometimes, howev-
er, the bargain in a marriage contract is rather more explicit on
terms in addition to, or different from, the standard default con-
tract.
In dealing with the history of the family in England, historian
Lawrence Stone has urged a focus on three modern western as-
sumptions about domestic life. The first of these assumptions is that
"there is a clear dichotomy between marriage for interest, meaning
money, status or power, and marriage for affect, meaning love,
friendship or sexual attraction; and that the first is morally repre-
hensible.""6 The second is that "sexual intercourse unaccompanied
by an emotional relationship is immoral, and that marriage for
interest is therefore a form of prostitution.""7 The third assump-
tion is that personal autonomy "is paramount.""'
Stone's argument is that the history of marriage and the family
is not one uniformly based on these assumptions."' Whatever we
conclude about the historical issues which Stone addresses, it seems
that we must, in discussing our own institutions, understand that
older ideas are not dead. 20 Our world is one in which newer ideas
are superimposed on older ones, but the older ones survive nonethe-
less. Society's older ideas included not only ideas suggested by
Stone's discussion, but also ideas relating to the permanence and
stability of marriage, as well as ideas of strong interests, connec-
tions, and affections which are not marital.
Our present cultural assumption is that marriages, to be re-
spectable, must be for love. As Georg Simmel suggested, there is a
"disparagement of personal dignity that nowadays arises in every
marriage that is not based on personal affection."' 2 ' A "sense of
decency," he continued, "requires the concealment of economic mo-
tives."' This, he noted, is not the case "in simpler cultures."2 '
Whether or not nineteenth-century England was a simpler
culture, it seems to have been a culture in which the love and mon-
ey issues of marriage were much discussed. And while an English
his and hers. See JESSE BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE (1982).
116. LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800,
at 86 (1977).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 87.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 87-88.
121. GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 380 (David Frisby ed., Tom
Bottomore & David Frisby trans., 2d ed. 1990).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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sense of decency might have required discussion of "love," English
values also allowed Trollope to paint a nonjudgmental picture of a
man who proposed to four women in one year, finally marrying the
last.'24
It is reported that Trollope composed hundreds of marriage
proposals in his roughly fifty novels. A few of them will be referred
to here, including the one that apparently was his own. It seems
legitimate to focus on a nineteenth-century English writer here.
Even today, discussion of marriage and family typically begins with
the traditional views expressed in Maynard v. Hill'25 or the defini-
tion of Hyde v. Hyde.2 ' While some variation exists between
American and English marriage relationships, the basics are sub-
stantially similar; at an any rate, they are similar enough for the
purposes of this discussion." 7
There are, of course, differences between our situation and the
social situations Trollope describes. One difference is the role of the
father in the marital negotiations of the children. For example, in Is
He Popenjoy?, the father "stipulates" for his engaged daughter a
house of her own in London. A married woman, he believes, "should
always have some home of her own."" s Here, both the Father's
role and the substance of his demand do not accord with middle-
class expectations. The role of the father is again strikingly illus-
trated in a sentence from Ralph the Heir: "He engaged hisself to me
-to marry her."29
A second issue is the perception of marital control. In Trollope's
era, marital control often meant the direct regulation by the hus-
band of the hourly activity of his often child-wife, including her
reading and domestic concerns. 3 ' Finally, more generally on the
question of the status of women, the work of Trollope, which pre-
124. See 2 TROLLOPE, supra note 111. Trollope simply portrayed the man as
ordinary and not particularly sensitive. Note also the contrast between revocable and
irrevocable love in Orley Farm. ANTHONY TROLLOPE, ORLEY FARM 270 (David Skilten,
ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1985) (1862) [hereinafter TROLLOPE, ORLEY FARIA].
125. 125 U.S. 190, 205-16 (1888).
126. Hyde v. Hyde, 1 L.R.-P. & D. 130 (1866).
127. There also is a general and academic interest in Trollope. See Louise Wein-
berg, Is It All Right to Read Trollope?, 62 AM. SCHOLAR 447, 447-51 (1993).
128. 1 ANTHONY TROLLOPE, Is HE POPENJOY? 13 (John Sutherland ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1986) (1878).
129. 2 TROLLOPE, supra note 111, at 101.
130. In the modem American context, this type of control is not what we mean
by male dominance within a marriage. Instead, the modem idea of marital control
has more to do with subordination of a wife's independent interest to her husband's
career and comfort. The husband's life ultimately defines family life. Additionally,
there is sometimes an issue of physical abuse.
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dates women's suffrage in England and largely ridicules women's
political rights, contrasts sharply with contemporary views of
women's rights."'1
While not realistic in the sense of naturalistic fiction or social-
ist realism, Trollope's work is usually understood to have a pro-
found realism. Nathaniel Hawthorne asked: "Have you ever read
the novels of Anthony Trollope? ... [They are] just as real as if
some giant had hewn a great lump out of the earth and put it under
a glass case, with all its inhabitants going about their daily busi-
ness . ...
Trollope's various marriage proposals represent a set of typical
conversations about marriage. One editor has suggested that the
classic problem in Trollope, is that of marriage for love or mon-
ey. 3 Trollope's view of marriage-or perhaps ultimately his ques-
tions about marriage-intensified over time. In the end, he seems to
have had many questions and doubts about the institution of mar-
riage. While Trollope thought it necessary that love be stressed in
novels, particularly the love of young people, he seemed very clear
about the complexity of the motivations of those about to set up
joint lives together.'34 This seemed particularly true when his
characters were no longer young. Trollope's general view of mar-
riage is found in Phineas Finn, in the voice of a woman:
I shall take the first that comes after I have quite made up my
mind. You'll think it very horrible, but that is really what I shall
do. After all, a husband is very much like a house or a horse. You
don't take your house because it's the best house in the world, but
because just then you want a house. You go and see a house, and if
its very nasty you don't take it. But if you think it will suit pretty
well, and if you are tired of looking about for houses, you do take
it.
13 5
131. For discussion, see N. JOHN HALL, TROLLOPE: A BIOGRAPHY 339-44 (1991).
132. ANTHONY TROLLOPE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 133 (1936) (quoting Hawthorne's
letter to James Field).
133. John Sutherland, Introduction to ANTHONY TROLLOPE, PHINEAS FINN: THE
IRISH MEMBER 7, 25 (John Sutherland ed., Penguin Books 1972) (1869) [hereinafter
TROLLOPE, PHINEAS FINN]; see ANTHONY TROLLOPE, AN OLD MAN'S LOVE 245-65
(John Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1884).
134. Trollope described his own marriage as essentially happy and successful. He
wrote in his autobiography "My marriage was like the marriage of other people, and
of no special interest to any one except my wife and me." TROLLOPE, supra note 132,
at 64-65. In fact, his marriage has been of considerable interest to biographers and
the subject of some speculation though very little is actually known about his mar-
riage or his wife. See, e.g., VICTORIA GLENDINNING, ANTHONY TROLLOPE 143-53 (1991)
(describing Trollope's marriage). Also see TROLLOPE, supra note 132, at 288, in which
he records the significance in his life of his friendship with an unidentified American
woman (Kate Field, whom he met in 1860).
135. TROLLOPE, PHINEAS FINN, supra note 133, at 132. Also see TROLLOPE, ORLEY
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Marriage for Trollope is a solution to problems which vary with
the situation of the individuals involved. Marriage resolves the
issue of leaving the parental nest while simultaneously producing,
hopefully, a situation of which parents can approve. Marriage also
solves the problem of who shall be the coparent of desired offspring,
or who shall fill up a life in other ways when offspring are not seen
as part of the future. Marriage provides a co-income producer when
that is needed or cook-housekeeper-companion when that is needed.
The problem comes first, the model solution second and the individ-
ual third. Trollope often discusses love in terms of something which
one hopes to achieve after marriage. To learn to love someone is an
enterprise for certain young women after the man has been accept-
ed.
In some of Trollope's work, the explicit individual motivations
for marriage are apparent, and it is clear that the search for a
spouse is a means to particular ends. For example, in one of his
later works, Mr. Scarborough's Family,"6 Trollope offered a long
negotiation over the marriage contract between a man who wants
an heir and a woman who wants a good establishment with a resi-
dence for her friend and companion.'
A The Proposal and Some Contracts Issues
Trollope's proposal in Dr. Thorne (apparently his own proposal
to Rose Hazeltine) suggests that the offer-and-acceptance aspect of
the marriage contract may be very elliptical as to details.
Gentleman: Well miss, the long and short of it is this: here I am.
Take me or leave me.
FARM, supra note 124, which contrasts the method of "moulding a wife" with the
"ordinary plan": "Dance with the girl three times and if you like the light of her eye
and the tone if her voice with which she, breathless, answers your little questions
about horseflesh and music-about affairs masculine and feminine-then take the
leap in the dark." Id. at 328-29.
On certain models of marriage, the spousal relationship involves economic
cooperation and the raising of children. In relation to each other, spouses may have
secondary roles. A familiar expression of this view of marriage (if not a worse one) is
found in Plato's description of the penultimate encounter of Socrates and Xanthippe.
PLATO, PHAEDO (Frederick J. Church ed., 1951). For discussion of changing concep-
tions of, and demands on, marriage, see Barbara Ehrenreich, Burt, Loni and Our
Way of Life, TIME, Sept. 20, 1993, at 92; Margaret Mead, What Does the American
Man Expect of a Wife?, REDBOOK MAG., May 1962, at 28, 30. See also Carol
Weisbrod, Divorce Stories: Readings, Comments and Questions on Law and Narrative,
1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 156-61.
136. ANTHONY TROLLOPE, MR. SCARBOROUGH's FAMLY 240-60 (Geoffrey Harvey
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1989) (1883).
137. Id.
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Lady: scratching a gutter in the sand with her parasol... Of
course I know that's all nonsense.
Gentleman: nonsense. By Jove it isn't nonsense at all. come, Jane,
here I am. come, at any rate you can say something.
Lady: yes, I suppose I can say something.
Gentleman: well, which is it to be take me or leave me.
Lady: ... well I don't exactly want to leave you ....
And so it was settled. 1"
The fact that the parties are "polite lovers,'--a "gentleman" and a
"lady"-assumes something about the context of the transaction.
The indirection of the acceptance says something also. A lady's
acceptance may be hesitant, tremulous, and weak, but is nonethe-
less enough. Even if there had been a certain amount of pressure
put on the lady, duress would likely not be found.
Bishop notes that "[p]ersons are nowhere compelled to mar-
ry."139 This is true in the sense that fraud and duress will void a
marriage and that in the modern world direct compulsion is viewed
as an evil.'40 But, as a Trollope novel has it, a girl is "'taught to
presume that it was her destiny to be married.'"' A man, by con-
trast, generally "regards it as his destiny either to succeed or fail in
the world."' Marriage is assumed as desirable, for both, but quite
differently in Trollope's world.
Capacity to consent is also an issue. An old French argument
on parental consent had it that the consent of elders was necessary
because when a man was under the influence of the most imperious
of the passions, he was not exercising free will.'4 ' So perhaps
"love," of itself, disqualifies men and women about to marry from an
appropriately contractual state of mind.' (The issue of the emo-
tional state undercutting consent in those ordinarily capable of
contracting is familiar in contracts and often quite difficult. None-
theless men and women equally enter into contracts, and it should
138. ANTHONY TROLLOPE, DocTOR THORNE 87-88 (Ruth Kendell ed., Penguin
Books 1991) (1858); see HALL, supra note 131, at 88-89, 167-68 (concluding that
Trollope was recounting his own history).
139. 1 BISHOP, supra note 14, § 1.
140. Id. §§ 210-13.
141. HALL, supra note 131, at 89 (quoting ANTHONY TROLLOPE, AN EYE FOR AN
EYE).
142. Id.
143. JEAN L. FLANDRIN, FAMILIES IN FORMER TIMES 39 (1979).
144. See Stake, supra note 2, at 441 (discussing "romantic intoxication"). But in
other contexts there may be a demand for prudence. See generally Harry W.
Vanneman, Annulment of Marriage for Fraud, 9 MINN. L. REV. 497, 500-17 (1925). A
quite deliberate and rational approach to marital decision-making, to the extent that
it involves children, is suggested by the idea that genetic counselling is useful
premaritally as a factor influencing the decision whether or not to marry.
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not be concluded that anything said here is an attempt to open the
issue of lack of capacity generally because of differential gender so-
cialization.)
The real point, as Llewellyn noted, is that "[a]greement does
not even today carry any necessary connotation of real willing-
ness.""5 Indeed, "acquiescence in the lesser evil is all that need be
understood,"; it is essentially a factual question. 46 "The problem of
'reality of consent' is essentially one of determining what types of
pressure or other stimuli are sufficiently out of line with our gener-
al presuppositions of dealing to open the expression of agreement to
attack."4 ' We assume that the pressure on women particularly to
marry is given, and is no more of a problem than the pressure to
buy food.
The language of Trollope's proposal assumes that a great deal
about the details of the arrangement is known by both parties, as
would be the case in any specific social context." (Or to the ex-
tent not known, as contractual material is not known, not important
until some disaster strikes.) The deal itself is standard. The dick-
ered terms, as Llewellyn would have put it, relate largely to the
individuals in the deal. At this point, the parties might have wanted
to discuss major deviations from the standard arrangement. Project-
ing the story forward some decades, one can imagine that conven-
tional deviations might have involved the childless marriage; a
career (as against a job, or a domestic life) for the wife; the presence
of resident in-laws, all quite possibly "dickered" in fact. Beyond this,
in the background, the other terms are provided by the situation.
Societies indicate the responsibilities of a wife, a doctor's wife, a
farmer's wife. The roles are what is being assumed by the agree-
ment to marry. And in one sense the whole matter is, as Trollope
says, a "leap in the dark."5 '
In these terms, an arranged marriage is a standardized con-
tract largely mandatory in its terms in which the parties do not
select each other. 5' In some cases, nothing much is said by the
145. Llewellyn, supra note 38, at 728 n.49.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 728; see Standard Fin. Co. v. Ellis, 657 P.2d 1056, 1061 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1983) (refusing to allow abused wife to avoid obligation based on claim of du-
ress); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997, 1024-36 (1985).
148. Despite the familiar comment that "necessitous men are not, truly speaking,
free men." Vernon v. Bethell, 28 Eng. Rep. 838, 839 (1762).
149. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
150. Both Ralph the Heir and Orley Farm use this language. TROLLOPE, ORLEY
FARM, supra note 124, at 329; 2 TROLLOPE, supra note 111, at 329.
151. In some contexts, however, they may have met through arrangement, an
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individual parties because nothing has to be said. The context pro-
vides the terms as between the individuals, and the families have
done the bargaining which had to be done.152
Some marital negotiation may involve ideas contrary to the
official ideal of the marriage contract.153 Consider the following
proposal, from Anita Brookner's Hotel du Lac:
"I am proposing a partnership of the most enlightened kind. A
partnership based on esteem, if you like. Also out of fashion, by the
way. If you wish to take a lover, that is your concern, so long as
you arrange it in a civilized manner."
"And if you... "
"The same applies, of course. For me, now, that would always
be a trivial matter. You would not hear of it nor need you care
about it. The union between us would be one of shared interests, of
truthful discourse. Of companionship. To me, now, these are the
important things. And for you they should be important. Think,
Edith. Have you not, at some time in your well-behaved life, de-
sired vindication? Are you not tired of being polite to rude peo-
ple?" 54
This bargain, which does not end at the altar, stresses the social
realities of marriage and the importance placed on marriage for
women, especially, in terms of respectability and status. The
arrangement'55 fails because, in effect, there was too much com-
promise and not enough love in the deal.'
Some contracts, of course, are for nonmarital sex-money ar-
rangements. In Trollope, these are seen as traditional in Europe,
and also in fact in England.'57 Far from being expressions of indi-
intermediate form.
152. Trollope makes clear the generally powerful role of families in arranging
marriages. See, e.g., ANTHONY TROLLOPE, CAN You FORGIVE HER? 13-34 (Andrew
Swarbricke ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1982) (1864) (describing the arranged marriage
between Glencora and Duke).
153. For example, an agreed-upon childless marriage would have been such a
case before the public acceptance and legalization of contraception.
154. ANITA BROOKNER, HOTEL DU LAc 166-67 (1984). A marriage similar to this
is described by Trollope, but it looks more like a modification of the contract than
the original contract. 2 TROLLOPE, supra note 128, at 20-33. On open marriage con-
tracts, see Schultz, supra note 2, at 221-23.
155. The proposal, with its agreed-upon tolerances explicitly on the table, also is
suggestive of a comment of Trollope's to the effect that when he was a child a dis-
tinction was made between games in which cheating was allowed, agreed upon in
advance, and games in which cheating was not allowed. 1 ANTHONY TROLLOPE,
NORTH AMERICA 144 (St. Martins Press 1986) (1862).
156. BROOKNER supra note 154, at 167. Historically, love-based deals have also
fallen through because of parental refusal to give consent. For example, Edward
Gibbon recounts his early love, his father's refusal to approve, and his subsequent
life as an unmarried man of letters. GIBBON, supra note 113, at 104-05.
157. See the proposals, first non-marital and then marital, of the Duke of Omni-
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vidual bohemianism, they are understood as entirely conventional
in nature.15
Some nonmarital arrangements15 can involve fairly explicit
contracting. For example, in Comeback by Dick Francis the follow-
ing brief encounter is described:
Into a long smiling silence, lolling back in the armchair, I said
casually, "How about a bonk, then?"
She laughed. "Is that Foreign Office standard phraseology?"
"Heard all the time in embassies."
She'd long had the intention and I hadn't misread her.
"No strings," she said. "Passing ships."
I nodded.
"Upstairs," she said economically, taking my glass.'
Ross Thomas describes another non-marital situation: "We had
one of those oh so modern arrangements, he lived here and we split
expenses. He gave me a check every month for seven hundred and
fifty dollars and I paid the bills-food the mortgage utilities things
like that. He was sort of a star boarder, I guess." "'1 These exam-
ples involve language. The language is a clue to transactional pat-
terns which may well be standard and subject to analysis as default
contracts.
Some feminist issues involved in the question of marriage and
other domestic contracts are obvious. One is status after marriage,
summarized in 1700 by the wife-to-be in a play by Congreve, who
suggested that even after she had negotiated as fully as possible for
what she wanted, it would still be necessary to "dwindle into a
wife."6
2
The wife is inferior to the husband in marriage because, for
some, the female is inferior to the male in general. Trollope, for
example, believed in the hierarchy of male and female 63 and sug-
un to Madame Max Goesler. See also ANTHONY TROLLOPE, THE WAY WE LIVE Now
(Random House 1984) (1875).
158. "The baron knows what is expected of him," Collette wrote in Gigi.
159. While nonmarital arrangements may vary widely, all might be called cohab-
itation and be analyzed in terms of contract. These would include cases in which
marriage is desired but not possible and also cases in which marriage is not desired
and not necessarily relevant as a model (for example, sibling domestic arrangements).
160. DICK FRANcIs, COMEBACK 184-85 (1991).
161. Ross THoM&AS, No QUESTIONs ASKED 112 (1976) (written under pseudonym
Oliver Bleeck).
162. WILLIAM CONGREVE, THE WAY OF THE WORLD (Henry T.E. Perry ed.,
Appleton-Century-Crofts 1951) (1796); see also Katha Pollitt, Bothered and Bewil-
dered, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1993, at A23. Pollitt notes that when women are eco-
nomically self-sufficient, they are willing to take care of children, but not willing to
care for husbands, although "most men still seem to expect it." Id.
163. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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gested that Eve would not have tempted Adam had she not accepted
him as her Lord.' The link to marriage is made plain in a com-
ment in which one of Trollope's characters defines marriage as the
"manner in which the all-wise Creator has thought fit to make the
weaker vessel subject to the stronger one."'65 While the statement
is rejected by the woman to whom it is addressed, it is rejected on
the narrow point that the particular man under discussion is not fit
to dominate her.166
When Lord Tennyson wrote, in Locksley Hall, of the husband to
whom the wife was "something better than his dog, a little dearer
than his horse" he described a boorish master in a relationship in
which there would always be a master.'67  When, in Mr.
Scarborough's Family, Trollope describes a father urging a daughter
to marry a man who will not mis-treat her, he is thinking along
similar lines though describing a kinder individual."
Inequality traditionally underlies the idea of husband and wife,
even when there is no direct reference to it. In the United States,
Justice Bradley's late nineteenth-century concurrence in Bradwell v.
Illinois"' remains a classic statement of the conventional under-
standing.7 ' Justice Bradley wrote: "The paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother. This is the law of the Creator."7' Wife and mother,
164. 2 TROLLOPE, supra note 155, at 96. The combination of marriage for interest
and conventional feminine behavior can be presented as comic. Thus in a novel by
Wodehouse, a father insists on a show of sentiment and enthusiasm from his daugh-
ter who is more direct about the central aspect of the (ultimately failed) arrange-
ment. PELHAM G. WODEHOUSE, IF I WERE YOU 17-19 (1931).
The daughter tells her father "you know and I know that it's simply a busi-
ness deal. I provide the money, Tony supplies the title .... You brought me down
here to land Tony. And I've landed him." Id. at 17. Finally, she responds to her
father's insistence on affect and role-playing and displays some appropriate enthusi-
asm: "Oh, Father dear,' said Violet girlishly, 'when Tony asked me to be his wife, I
was so taken aback and so completely flabbergasted to think that he should feel that
way about me that I simply gasped.'" Id. at 18.
165. ANTHONY TROLLOPE, LINDA TRESSEL 253 (Robert Tracy ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1991) (1868).
166. Id.
167. ALFRED TENNYSON, Locksley Hall, in LOCKSLEY HALL, DAYDREAM AND OTHER
POEMS 34, 38 (New York, T.Y. Crowell & Co. 1892). Trollope, too, invoked the dog
image in a speech by Laura. "You cannot make a woman subject to you as a dog is
so. You may have all the outside and as much of the inside as you can master. With
a dog you may be sure of both." TROLLOPE, PHINEAS FINN, supra note 133, at 398.
168. TROLLOPE, supra note 136, at 498.
169. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). The Court held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not prevent the state from limiting admission to the bar to men. Id. at
138-39.
170. Id. at 139 (Bradley, Swain & Field, JJ., concurring).
171. Id. at 141-42 (Bradley, Swain & Field, JJ., concurring); see SIMMEL, supra
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without economic independence or political rights. The law of the
creator was to be applied universally, despite the fact that women
might not marry, since "the rules of civil society must be adapted to
the general constitution of things and cannot be based on exception-
al cases." The idea of individualized contract is exactly about
the possibility of making room for exceptional cases, within or out-
side of the framework of marriage.
The discussion in this Essay to this point has been intended to
illustrate exchanges and bargains in-fact and to raise certain con-
tracts issues relating largely to issues of entry into domestic con-
tracts. Whether we want to consider these bargain-in-fact "legal
contracts" will turn in part on problems of enforcement. These is-
sues require a separate discussion, and are the subject of part IV.
IV. SOME ISSUES OF REMEDIES AND ENFORCEMENT
We have long indulged in the presumption that no amount of
effort or agreement on the part of individuals can result in a con-
tract unless there is a law ready to give that effect to the acts of
the parties. Hence we must argue in a circle: the law will recognize
and enforce as contracts such agreements as it chooses to recognize
and enforce.
Nathan Isaacs
Contracts, Torts and Trusts
To some degree, the perspective used here assumes a world in
which law is ubiquitous, floating over and capable of creating a con-
text for all relationships and all behavior. Subject to the self-re-
straint of constitutions or conventions, everything is, in theory,
within the law's reach.
All relationships can also be seen through the law of con-
tracts-some more comfortably than others.3 By bending and
twisting the idea of choice, most relationships can be understood as
chosen, even if the choice is the refusal of an association. Even the
note 121, at 378 ("The significance and the consequences that society attaches to the
sexual relations between man and woman are correspondingly based on the presup-
position that the woman gives her total self, with all its worth, whereas the man
gives only a part of his personality in the exchange."); see also CAROLE PATEMAN,
THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 16-17 (1988).
172. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141-42 (Bradley, Swain & Field, JJ., concurring).
173. See, e.g., Diana T. Meyers, Introduction to KINDRED MATTERS: RETHINKING
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FAMILY 14 (Diana T. Myers et al. eds., 1993) (suggesting
child's acceptance of benefits as possibly creating contractual relationship). Perhaps
even involuntary relationships-for example, in-laws--can be understood as ancillary
to the primary choice to marry.
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idea that we cannot choose our parents is modified as we see chil-
dren choosing new parents not only "spiritually"-as they used to
say-but legally. Within the law of contracts, some bargains are not
contracts but are mere agreements, to be left without State inter-
vention in whatever situation may then exist.174 One issue in de-
termining the answer to the question of which bargains become con-
tracts relates to issues of enforcement.
The contractual view focuses on individual autonomy in a way
that denies much reality in the world. It is true in the same sense
that stone walls do not a prison make, and that what matters is not
the thing but our response to the thing. The contractual emphasis
would cut against an observation to the effect that, for example,
women do not "choose" their traditional roles.'75 Rather, the argu-
ment assumes that one can choose the path of least resistance, and
that in fact most people do.'76 In the end, the contractual empha-
sis is not a truth or a rule of law but a possibility, to be accepted or
rejected in particular circumstances.
The problem which some of the Realists saw was that contract
law had a single set of rules, which applied to all cases. In the con-
text of sales, 77 rather than attempting to define and then impose
a perfect model, they developed the Uniform Commercial Code as a
framework for different models, different forms, now and in the
future. As the statute was a framework for commercial models, the
contract was a framework for human behavior. Thus Llewellyn
wrote that "the major importance of legal contract is to provide a
frame-work for well-nigh every type of group organization and for
well-nigh every type of passing or permanent relation between indi-
viduals and groups, up to and including states."'
174. This section does not deny the point that, in general, there is an over em-
phasis on the legal and remedial aspects of contract law, and inadequate stress on
contract as on-going framework. See Macaulay, supra note 1, at 512-25.
175. See Shultz, supra note 2, at 226-28.
176. Thus people choose to marry rather than to negotiate special or individual-
ized contracts covering some of the same ground. There are overriding issues of
knowledge of the law are involved here.
Lynn Baker argues that people should know more about the economic aspects
relating to the law of marriage. Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating The Marriage Contract,
23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 217, 224-37 (1990). For example, people may be particularly
ignorant of the tax consequences of the marriage contract or the economic issues of
divorce. The argument for default contracts assumes that the central expectations of
marriage are generally known.
177. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text (discussing promulgation of
Uniform Sales Act). But see Isaacs, supra note 63, at 667.
178. Llewellyn, supra note 38, at 736-37. The framework was not rigid.
Llewellyn observed as to contracts that they are so overlaid with unrecorded adjust-
ments and further factual agreements that in the end "the initial contract [is] a
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The marriage contract was itself such a framework for the
individuals and a variation in that contract-whether or not
litigated-would, for those individuals, adjust the framework. Even
when a court might say, as in the well known case of Balfour v.
Balfour,179 that a contract between husband and wife could not
stand, this was because such a contract was thought to be not in-
tended in fact.180 It might, then, have been intended on some other
facts, including a changed conventional understanding about the
legitimacy of such contracts.
Of course any contract may still be "unconscionable" or "unfair,"
and thus unenforceable. 8' The problem for us is not so much judi-
cial power to police domestic contracts for fairness and the like as
our judicial standard. What are the objectives of the state in these
contexts? What is fair? How do we know it? Where do we look for
state policy on the question? Here the perspective interior to con-
tract law offers certain assistance.
Once we knew-or felt-when a contract was unconscionable or
unfair under the assumptions about the nature of marriage, the
family, and men and women on which the traditional arrangements
were based. Once state policy on marriage referred to an answer-
able question. We knew that the traditional family was the goal.
That family had a certain shape, and people within it had certain
roles. 82 Without elaborating the point again here, it is clear
enough that the family was not egalitarian either as to adults and
children or husband and wife. This point about roles and hierarchy
has consequences for the idea of fairness. If a woman is a breeder or
entertainer or housekeeper, and is generally viewed as replaceable,
if not disposable, then a small pension on divorce may be "fair." It
may be "fair" that most of the money should remain with the one
who had earned it through activity in the market. This would be
true, no matter how great the wife's reliance on the idea and even
the representation that marriage meant sharing, each bringing
wholly misleading guide to what occurs." Id.
179. 2 K.B. 571 (1919).
180. Id. at 579-80. The court believed that the parties "never intended to make
a bargain which could be enforced in law." Id. at 575. On intention in Balfour, see
KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 41, at 100.
181. See U.C.C. § 2-302. Even aside from such a direct policing doctrine, results
can be achieved by manipulation of technical doctrines, although "[c]overt tools are
never reliable tools." Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700, 703
(1939).
182. For examples of the law reinforcing traditional societal views of marriage,
see Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 203-16 (1888); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 161-68 (1878); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 137-39 (1872); id. at
139-42 (Bradley, Swain, Field, JJ., concurring).
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what he or she could to the marriage without withholding and with-
out specific valuation. How, after all, could she have "reasonably
relied," considering the general cultural stance which insisted that
money "really" belonged to those who "earned" it?1"' If charity,
goodness, or guilt indicated transfer payments to the ex-wife, then
honor to the man who made generous payments. The matter had
little to do with her entitlement. And of course her lost opportunity
was understood not as lost market-income but as a different spouse.
If she, divorced, lacked money or status, the solution was re-mar-
riage.
These assumptions are to a considerable degree rejected today
as they relate to the marriages and domestic arrangements of young
people. Women are formally, and sometimes actually, as free as
men to seek opportunities in the market, in the home, in public and
private life. This means that domestic arrangements will take many
forms, not merely the traditional or conventional one. Here, an
explicit agreement-in-fact could be used today as a reference point
when the legal system addressed the issues of fairness or unconscio-
nability if the arrangement came into litigation as a contract, or as
general background if the issue of fault arises in other ways, since
the model of the marriage chosen and a statement of entitlements
may well have some relevance to our judicial assessment of equities.
Whether or not a legal contract, the agreement-in-fact could be a
source of information, establishing the expectations of the parties in
a way not relevant only to official enforcement but to issues of fault
or good faith which might arise in various contexts.1"
One way to think about a diversity of marital arrangements is
to focus on individual contracts. Another is to think about struc-
tured menus, state offered options, to which individuals give their
consent. Perhaps the simplest way to think about the issues created
by a system of alternative domestic models, including issues of state
enforcement of contracts, is to remember the examples we actually
have of the different forms of marriage, within the rules of various
183. See JOHN K. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 30-37, 59-60
(1973) (describing wives as 'crypto-servants" doing menial labor even where husband
is highly paid).
184. The idea that the parties provided information about the standards by which
performance is judged is one of the ideas of Article Two. "Article 2, then, judges
performance, and provides remedies, principally by standards within the control of
the parties. Indeed, the Code recurrently invites the parties to state in the contract
of sale who shall do what, where and how, and with what consequences, subject only
to an inhibition against unconscionability." Ellen A. Peters, Remedies, for Breach of
Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under The Uniform Commercial Code: A
Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 202 (1963).
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religious communities. Llewellyn once referred to the "vicious heri-
tage" of viewing the parties to a contract as individuals.'85 The use
of religious law helps us recall that point, especially because reli-
gious law remains particularly strong with reference to the family.
Religious groups are often in the background, behind the individu-
als who are, working through the contractual framework, creating
the new family group. Religious law can be used as illustrative of
contract terms to suggest the sort of substantive regulation we
might be thinking about.
We might think of a contractual menu for domestic arrange-
ments, including marriage and divorce according to different reli-
gious rules as well as marital and non-marital partnerships. This
menu might include conventions of Muslim divorce.'86 Another
menu option might be a traditional Catholic rule, forbidding birth
control and divorce. The menu might include an option for Jewish
marriage and divorce, attempting somehow to deal with the "get"
issue."8 7 The menu would allow a couple to choose an option (then:
to modify it? waive provisions? and in fact do all the things that
make contract law itself flexible and thus uncertain?). If the couple
did not choose, a default option would come into play, which again
could possibly be subject to revision and modiflcation."
Remedies discussions in the context of divorce ordinarily focus
on the remedies to be given a spouse (typically assumed to be a
wife) disadvantaged by the departure of a partner, and often as-
sumed to have the money but unwilling to give it up. The disadvan-
tage is seen to arise from the fact that the wife either never serious-
ly entered the market or left it early.
The range of choices which the framework 89 might include
185. Llewellyn, supra note 38, at 734 n.63.
186. Note the current controversy in India over support/maintenance orders under
Islamic law. See P. Jagonmohan Reddy, Shah Bano Verdict and Muslim Law, in THE
SHAH BANO CONTROVERSY 41, 41-45 (Asghar Ali Engineer ed., 1987); Anika Rahmun,
Note, Religious Rights Versus Women's Rights in India: A Test Case for International
Human Rights Law, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 473, 473-82 (1990). The use of
religious options in the menu raises complex issues, some of them arising simply
from the concept of separation of church and state. The constitutional problem is not
addressed here.
187. Under Jewish law, Rabbis do not grant the divorce. The husband must sup-
ply the document of divorce called a "get." At present, the state will be reluctant to
use physical sanctions against a recalcitrant husband, although historically the reli-
gious authorities were not so reluctant. See generally Leo Pfeffer & Alan Pfeffer, The
Agunah in American Secular Law, 31 J. CHURCH & ST. 487, 487-525 (1989).
188. Default options could be fact specific. Examples include divorce for marriages
with minor children, summary divorce for short, no assets-no debts marriages, and
special rules on divorce for older couples without children of the marriage.
189. See Scott, supra note 2, at 38-70; Stake, supra note 2, at 429-44 (suggest-
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becomes clear if we think broadly about remedies for breech, and
recall that the contractual options-following the UCC-might in-
clude agreed-upon remedies, as well as statutory remedies.
It is clear that remedies are a cultural institution, and that in
this culture, certain remedies are assumed to be inappropriate. We
do not hang people for violating the sanctity of contract. Our sense
of the appropriate remedy for breach of contracts starts, convention-
ally, with money damages. When our thinking moves to what the
law of contracts considers the atypical remedy, some sort of specific
performance, we run into serious difficulty in the domestic context.
To begin with, it is clear that in many family cases, money is not an
adequate remedy and our thinking does have to turn to other possi-
bilities.9 ' Thus, surrogacy contracts (in which one wants the
child), promises to give a get (a Jewish religious divorce), and prom-
ises for the religious upbringing of children all present instances in
which money is not really the desired remedy. Yet other more direct
remedies may be barred, because, for example, personal services
contracts are not specifically enforceable and the Constitution guar-
antees the free exercise of religion.'91
But we should not conclude from this that no legal system can
ever attempt specific performance in this context. And, for the sake
of perspective, we might usefully recall the writ for the restitution
of conjugal rights. Although the remedy has in fact never been part
of American law,192 restitution of conjugal rights should be remem-
bered as a measure focused on reconciliation and as an example of
serious specific performance ideas in the domestic context.'93 (The
most that the law could have claimed-and sometimes did-was
ing framework of options).
190. By contrast, in the support-after-divorce context, it is a monetary award that
is desired.
191. Sometimes, in family cases, the point seems to be something about de mini-
mis, not the difficulty of finding a suitable remedy. For example, Bishop trivialized
the problem of the enforceable contract between husband and wife. See 2 BisHop,
supra note 14, § 192. Classic examples of cases which did not create enforceable
obligations (the broken date; the babysitter who didn't follow instructions) are now in
fact litigated.
192. Id. § 29 ("Over England, but not over this country, walks also that other
spawn of a dark age, whose mission it was to keep unconjugal sinners in the strait
performance of holy matrimonial duties."). Bishop explained that restitution of conju-
gal rights was an action in which an individual was "thrust back again to the bliss
which had been too lightly prized." Id.
193. Some writers use specific performance to mean performance of the obliga-
tions of marriage; for example, enforcement of the support obligation assumed at
marriage. Specific performance could also mean continuance of the marital status by
denying a divorce. Of course, the perpetuation of a marital relationship in law says
little about the existence of a domestic relationship in fact.
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that enforced proximity would result in increased tolerance and
compassion which might ultimate translate into something called
conjugal affection.'94) But if we will reject restitution of conjugal
rights perhaps we go too far in the other direction if we say that
enforceable contracts must be limited to the economics of the disso-
lution of the marriage. Possibly we could see a list of enforcement
possibilities develop over time as courts consider such theoretical,
contractually-agreed upon remedies as waiting periods for divorce
itself, or contractual adoption of (for example) penalties for initi-
ating divorce except for fault.
Issues of enforcement focused on particular enforcement mea-
sures deal, of course, with an assumption about entitlement. That
is, we speak of a remedy for someone who is entitled to that reme-
dy. Often our discussions focus on the reintroduction of categories of
fault. To begin with, fault and breach are not identical. But perhaps
more fundamentally, while there are such things as guilt and inno-
cence, they are perhaps less easily known than our discussions
sometimes assume. The analogue would be to limit discussion of
custody problems to conflicts between a fit and a grossly unfit par-
ent where the difficult case-and possibly the typical one-is the
conflict between two fit parents.
The following describes a commercial case: "The actual situa-
tion is complicated and confused, there are mutual recriminations,
each party accuses the other of bad faith, misconduct and faulty
performance; until the judicial dice have been rolled, no one has the
least idea of which side is in breach and which is not." 5' If this is
the truth of a commercial case, it is likely to be even more deeply
the truth of many domestic relations cases. Indeed, it was this prob-
lem that provided one of the original arguments for the move to no-
fault divorce. It was not that there was no fault, but rather that the
system could not usefully expend energy identifying it.'
194. Conjugal affection, Llewellyn notes, can only develop "out of lasting life
together." Llewellyn, Divorce I, supra note 31, at 1293. Note that the romantic drive
is not itself conjugal affection, though it produces it. 'The romantic ideal is itself the
most potent drive conceivable toward producing conjugal affection, if it can be freed
from its even greater drive toward impatience, and from mankind's yearning for
magic: that things which need work, self-restraint, thought, shall just happen of
themselves." Id. at 1293 n.29. See generally Raj Kumari Agarwala, Restitution of
Conjugal Rights under Hindu Law: A Plea for the Abolition of the Remedy, 12 J.
INDIAN L. INST. 257, 257-68 (1970). See also Kaur v. Harmander Singh, 1984 A.I.R.
(S.C.) 66, 66 (India) (upholding restitution of conjugal rights action).
195. KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 41, at 1060 n.4.
196. For a discussion of the no-fault idiom as one conveying the message that
marital breakdown is never anyone's fault, see MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 107-08 (1987).
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A contracts approach will not eliminate this problem, but will
allow us to consider the issue by including the understandings of
the particular parties.19 7 The ideas of breach, or good faith, or
fault applied to the controversies of the parties could be individual,
subject to some over-riding policing ideas. These policing ideas, with
such ideas as presumptive contracts and non-variable terms, permit
the articulation of state interests. The contracts approach permits
the development of both state and individual interests in a way, it
seems, that would be worth our time to explore. An individual
agreements/contracts approach does not minimize issues of state
interest, to the extent that the ideas of presumptive contracts or
non-variable terms or judicial policing provide ways to accommodate
collective interests.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper argues for a stance towards contracting derived
from perspectives interior to contract law. It does not argue for any
specific contract. Moreover, it concedes in relation to some bargains
that the contractual/commercial optic on domestic arrangements
would give rise to farce. For example, consider Chekhov's version of
the romance of the future in which a broker carries out a marriage
negotiation.19 When the young woman agrees to marry the man
the agent asks for a deposit.
The young lady gives the agent ten or twenty rubles. He takes
the money, bows obsequiously, and goes to the door.
"The receipt?" She stops him.
"Mille pardons, Madam. I completely forgot! Ha-ha!"
Balalaikin writes the receipt, bows again, and leaves. The
young lady covers her face with her hands and falls onto the divan.
"How happy I am!" she exclaims, seized by an emotion she has
never before experienced. "How happy I am! I love-and am
loved!"'99
But Chekhov's treatment of the contractual aspects of domestic
arrangements is not the only version possible.
The present article has suggested the utility of an analysis in
which all domestic arrangements are (thinly speaking) contractual.
The utility derives from an openness to the idea of individual varia-
197. The most difficult agreed-upon remedies seem to be those which provide for
an automatic award, or shift, of custody as a remedy for breach of a contractual
promise. In this situation, however, a review of the child's interest is necessary, as it
is with all other bargaining concerning children.
198. Anton Chekhov, Marriage in Ten or Fifteen Years, in ANTON CHEKHOV: SE-
LECTED STORIEs 74, 74-77 (Ann Dunnigan trans., 1960).
199. Id. at 76-77.
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tion, an idea elaborated in realist work on contracts. This approach
allows a distinction between negotiated and default aspects of par-
ticular relationships, "default" understood as state-defined contrac-
tual relationships in the absence of agreement to the contrary. Tra-
ditional domestic arrangements were described in terms of these
distinctions. For example, conventional marriages would be viewed
as resting on a choice of the default position while less conventional
marriages would represent a contract arrangement of a different
kind. The "method of silence," or the adhesion aspect of the default
position, could work-regardless of whether that default position
relates to traditional marriages or to roommate relationships-if the
underling social understandings were stable. Problems arise be-
cause individuals are attempting to structure and institutionalize
new relationships which are not clearly established in the society.
Further problems arise because the details of the several default
positions are not as clear as they once were. This suggests a role for
explicit agreements to clarify the expectations and intentions of the
parties and to communicate those expectations to the legal system,
should that system ever be invoked. Whether these agreements in-
fact should be directly enforced will depend, as it has always de-
pended, on a policy judgment itself heavily influenced by underlying
social factors, including the behavior, intentions and reliance of the
individuals involved, and the judicial reading of those factors."'
200. Corbin made the central point in the context of a discussion of offer and
acceptance:
The legal relations consequent upon offer and acceptance are not wholly
dependent, even upon the reasonable meaning of the words and acts of the
parties. The law determines these relations in the light of subsequent cir-
cumstances, these often being totally unforeseen by the parties. In such
cases it is sometimes said that the law will create that relation which the
parties would have intended had they foreseen. The fact is, however, that
the decision will depend upon the notions of the court as to policy, welfare,
justice, right and wrong, such notions often being inarticulate and subcon-
scious. (footnotes omitted).
Arthur Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26
YALE L.J. 169, 206 (1917).
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